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Genocide, and its Definition as the “Partial Elimination of a National Group”
Marcelo Ferreira

School of Philosophy and Literature, and School of Law, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina
Summary: This paper is primarily about the crimes committed by Argentina’s last military dictatorship and whether these
deserve the legal qualification of crimes against humanity or “genocide.” This question has consequences which go beyond the
field of law and affect society and collective psychology through the reconstruction of historical memory. From this perspective,
this paper argues that the definition of Genocide set forth in international law is directly applicable in Argentine national law.
It also examines the different problems with the use of this term. Finally, it aims to reconstruct the figure of Genocide from
the original interpretation of the works of Raphael Lemkin, and establish the “national” group as the superordinate term and
‘ethnic’, ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ groups as cohyponyms, where “national” group includes and goes beyond the other three groups,
and authorizes the inclusion of groups not explicitly covered by the 1948 Convention.
Keywords: Genocide, crimes against humanity, Argentina, memory, trials
Date of peer-review approval: May 30, 2012

Introduction
On March 24, 1976 the military seized power in Argentina. The de facto government headed by General
Jorge Rafael Videla kidnapped, tortured and killed thousands of people. Under the pretext of a war against
guerrillas, the military started a war against Argentine society as a whole. “As many as necessary will die to
restore peace in Argentina,” Videla promised in 1976. The following year, the former de facto governor of
Buenos Aires Province, Ibérico Saint Jean, stated: “First we will kill all the subversives, then we will kill their
collaborators, then their sympathizers, then those who remain indifferent, and finally we will kill the timid.”
To this end, over six hundred concentration camps were set up (here called ‘secret detention centers’), and the
term ‘disappeared’ became widespread. As Videla put it, a disappeared person was “an unknown entity ... They
do not exist. They aren’t there, either dead or alive. The person is ‘disappeared’.” From naval aircraft, thousands
of people were thrown alive into the sea.
In order to discipline society and change the economic structure of a country which had achieved
remarkable social equality and had a large middle class, the military performed a cleansing operation: a
surgical action to remove the harmful elements, whose way of thinking did not fit the ‘model’. Significantly,
the dictatorship called itself the ‘National Reorganization Process’: the word ‘process’ means “to change from
one state of affairs to another”. Most victims were detained in their homes or workplaces, in the presence of
witnesses, even though they were later reported to have been killed in combat. Impunity was guaranteed by
the absolute silence imposed on the press and the creation of ‘liberated areas’ in which the military could
kidnap and kill without interference from the police authorities, who were warned of operations in advance.
One of the defining features of repression was the indefinite status of the victims, whom the repressors
referred to as ‘subversives’. Although subversion was defined as ‘Marxist’, repression extended to sectors of the
population that had no connection with Marxism. The qualities attributed to subversives were as diverse as:
atheist, stateless, Freudian, pro-abortion, enemy of the family institution and, in general, anyone lacking in
national spirit (an enigmatic trait potentially applicable to anyone).
While acting like Nazis and treating Jews with special cruelty, the military regime had a quite different
ideology from National Socialism. It aimed to promote Liberalism, in the sense of a free market economy.
Argentina belonged to the ‘Western and Christian world’. Republican institutions were turned into caricatures
of themselves; there was no longer one president but a junta, comprising the heads of the Army, Navy and Air
Force. No Parliament, but parodying the notion of a balance of powers. These leaders held office for limited
periods of time (there were three military juntas).
The dictatorship permeated all social institutions, not just those related strictly to politics. They
clandestinely infiltrated factories and trade unions, and in schools, plain clothes police spied on school
children and teachers. The tragedy led to 30,000 disappearances and 4,400 people dropped into the sea, with
a network of over 600 clandestine detention centers.
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I. Difficulties in prosecuting crimes committed during the dictatorship
The prosecution of crimes committed in Argentina during the last military dictatorship is unprecedented
worldwide. The International Federation of Human Rights has stated that Argentina is the jurisdiction for
prosecuting crimes against humanity, and the UN Human Rights Council, consisting of forty-seven States,
has recognized Argentina as the undisputed world leader in this area. However, although these trials do credit
to Argentina’s justice system, they face many obstacles that prevent them following their proper course.
Indeed, the proliferation of trials on a case-by-case basis requires an endless parade of defendants and
witnesses, all of whom have to recount their sufferings time and again. Hundreds of lawsuits are filed against
one, two or three individuals – each starting again from scratch in an endless replay of the same scenario. The
Code of Criminal Procedure allows causes related to a particular detention center to be joined in a single trial
and witness statements to be read in court, but not all courts are willing to use these provisions.
In practice, each time victims take the witness stand, they are revictimized by being forced to relive their
trauma. The witnesses are in danger, and the defendants do not hesitate to threaten them.1 The Argentine judiciary
does not always have available locations for the hearings. In Comodoro Py, the “Vesuvius” trial shared the same
courtroom with those of the “Esma” and “ABO” (Atlético-Banco-Olimpo); while in La Plata, the Unit 9 trial has
been delayed in order to refurbish La Plata’s AMIA building, rented specially for the hearings.
Notwithstanding all of this, it is our contention that the main obstacle to justice in its broadest sense does
not lie in substantive or procedural difficulties, but in the legal qualification of the facts. The courts classify or
subsume the facts under different legal concepts – as described below – and these inevitably have long-term
consequences - legal and otherwise – that will define another important value: the construction of collective
memory. It is not only a question of applying penalties and sentencing the perpetrators to long years in prison
(an elusive goal, given their ages), but of rescuing and uplifting the very thing the genocidaires tried to erase:
our historical memory.
II. Legal descriptions: crimes against humanity and genocide
The Argentine Supreme Court of Justice, in “Simón, Julio Héctor et al, s / illegal deprivation of liberty,
etc.,” Case 17,768, placed crimes committed during the military dictatorship under the category of crimes
against humanity, thereby making the defenses of prescription and amnesty inadmissible. It is an undisputed
fact, then, that the crimes committed during the ‘National Reorganization Process” constitute crimes against
humanity.
The upcoming debate, which poses a dilemma for the courts, is whether these facts can also be framed
in the category of genocide. The confusion over the definition and scope of these two terms warrants
closer examination. crimes against humanity means any of the acts listed in Article 7 of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, when committed in a widespread or systematic manner against a civilian
population. The background of this definition is Article 6 of the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Control
Council Law No. 10, resolutions 3 (I) and 95 (I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the legal
principles contained in those documents (codified by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1950 as the
“Nuremberg Principles”).
Crimes against humanity were embodied in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg in the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, and arose as a result of the failure of international
military law to proscribe the Nazis crimes. The category of war crimes refers to victims who are enemy
combatants and the civilian populations of occupied countries, so it could not be used to judge atrocities
committed by the Nazis in Germany itself against German people: their own population. The categorycrimes
against humanity was created to remedy this deficiency.2
Article 6(c) of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal defined crimes against
humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”.
The broad formula contained in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court added further
categories under the following subsections: e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty
in violation of fundamental rules of international law, f) Torture, g) Rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and other serious sexual abuse; i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
j) The crime of apartheid.
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Crimes against humanity draws on various historical sources, including the older notion of crimes
against the law of nations, but it was the Nuremberg process that gradually gave rise to a class of crimes
applicable to all States, against any person and at all times and places, even without or against the will
of individual States. In contrast, offenses against the law of nations included behaviors such as piracy
or the slave trade but lacked the scope currently attributed to crimes against humanity.
Crimes against humanity differ from offenses against the law of nations in their fields of validity. 3
In turn, each of their fields of validity has certain characteristic features:
• Material scope: non-derogability / inadmissibility.
• Personal scope: individual responsibility / exclusion of the inadmissibility of the defenses
of superior orders and official capacity.
• Timescale: non-applicability of statutory limitations / retroactive application.
• Territorial scope: universal jurisdiction.
In this sense, crimes against humanity are more than just a set of offenses grouped under the same
name and designate something additional.
Crimes against humanity is a nomen iuris for a set of conditions under which the rules of domestic
law can be replaced by those of international law (e.g. suspending the rule of the non-retroactive
nature of criminal law). The reasoning is as follows:
• under certain circumstances (the catalog of crimes in question),
• and certain conditions (widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population),
• domestic law rules are displaced by international legal norms relating to due process of law.
The crime of torture, for example, is a crime against humanity if it occurs in the context of
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and is committed by people who
participate in that attack. Yet this is not the case where torture is committed either in the context of an
unconfirmed attack or by someone not related to the attack. It is a crime without statutory limits in the
first case, but not in the second. In this sense, crime against humanity does not only refer to specific
crimes; it is a qualification, which, when added to one of these crimes, entails the legal consequences
described above.
Likewise, genocide is not an isolated category, separate from crimes against humanity, but a
particular form of these crimes. All genocide involves the commission of crimes against humanity
although the opposite is not always true. Therefore, all the legal consequences described above are also
applicable to the crime of genocide.
Genocide includes any of the acts mentioned in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, when committed with intent to destroy in whole or in
part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such. The difference between genocide and
crimes against humanity is that genocide aims at the destruction of a group, and not just individuals
within the group. Genocide discriminates against a group while crimes against humanity are directed
indiscriminately against any civilian population.
The concept of genocide was foreshadowed in a qualitative distinction made by the Nuremberg
Tribunal, through two definitions contained in its Statute:
• murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
• persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with,
any of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not they constitute a
violation of the domestic law of the country where they had perpetrated.
Thus, a distinction is made between two classes of victims:
• any civilian population: indiscriminate victims;
• specific groups persecuted intentionally: victims of discrimination.
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The main difference between crimes against humanity and genocide is the nature of the victims: the
first case, the victims are chosen indiscriminately; in the second, they are well differentiated. The victims are
indiscriminate when criminal action falls on anyone, regardless of their condition or circumstances – anyone,
whoever they may be - and they are discriminated against when the criminal activity is directed not at an
undifferentiated subject, but at a subject defined as belonging to a particular group.
The 1948 Genocide Convention characterized the crime of genocide as intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. This tight framework, with only four protected groups,
has made the concept difficult to apply for several reasons, mainly because all genocides had political
motives beyond the ways in which the perpetrators defined their victims. As Daniel Feierstein has pointed
out, restricting the definition to four groups ignores two basic principles of law: equality before the law and
the impossibility of creating a hierarchy of human life. A murder is always a murder, whoever is killed, but
within the framework of the Genocide Convention, the deaths of some are more important than the deaths of
others.4 Furthermore, the Convention expressly omits political groups, which were protected in the first and
second draft of Article 2 of the Convention but were excluded from the final version due to geopolitical and
not real philosophical or juridical reasons.
In a similar vein, Zaffaroni argues that the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention is
problematic because “it is clearly intended to impose two limitations: one objective, that is, the omission of
political groups; and the other subjective, namely the intention to destroy the group totally or partially. These
limitations cannot be explained rationally. There is no legal definition of murder anywhere in the world that
ignores certain victims while at the same time requiring dolus directus of the first degree and excluding dolus
indirectus or dolus eventualis. All over the world homicide is the killing of any human being.”5 As Resolution
96/1 of the UN which called for the Genocide Convention clearly pointed out: “Genocide is a denial of the
right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human
beings” and, when referring to the groups, the Resolution included all possible groups under the sentence:
“Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political, and other groups
have been destroyed, entirely or in part”.6
The tight framing or ‘micro-surgical clipping’ of the Convention has resulted in its apparent inapplicability
to situations where an attack on people in one of the four protected categories has – supposedly - not been
verified. Consequently, “in all subsequent massacres it has been possible to raise doubts about whether or not
they were really genocides, with decisions being made purely in the short-term interests of the great powers”.7
So, the existence of genocide in Cambodia was denied when Pol Pot exterminated 2,200,000 people between
1975 and 1979 (around one-fourth of the population), because the aim was not to eliminate the population
but to politically cleanse the population of anyone infected with the ‘bourgeois virus’. These ‘class enemies’
were anyone who had completed seventh grade and could read, or who did not belong to the class of poor
peasants.8 Some have even argued there was no genocide in Rwanda, where Hutus eliminated a million Tutsis
in 1994. Their argument is that not all deaths occurred as a result of a positive State action.9
III. The difficulties of implementing the Convention on Genocide
Argentina acceded to the Genocide Convention by Decree 6286/1956 of April 9, 1956, and incorporated
it into the Constitution in 1994. Accordingly, the Convention takes precedence over domestic law.10 However,
even those judges that refuse to endorse genocide charges have usually not disputed the historical fact that
genocide took place. They simply question whether such charges are legally viable.
In sentencing ex-police chaplain Cristian Von Wernich,11 and former police commissioner Miguel
Etchecolatz,12 Judge Carlos Rozanski was the first making limited use of the concept of genocide in the formula
“crimes against humanity in the context of genocide”, including as the charge of the sentence. In the “Suarez
Mason”13 case, Judge Daniel Rafecas found it proven that the facts of the case “are undoubtedly a political
genocide or politicide”. In “Police Headquarters CDCs (Clandestine Detention Centers) / kidnappings and
disappearances (2nd group),” Judge Daniel Bejas described the facts as “crimes that occurred within the
context of the international crime of genocide”. The Federal Court of Córdoba sentenced Menéndez14 for
crimes against humanity, including genocide, and in Case 172/09, “Videla,” it established that the events, that
occurred in Penitentiary Unit No. 1 in Córdoba, were “genocidal practices constituting the crime of genocide.”
The Federal Court of Tucuman stated that the crimes against Vargas Aignasse15 deserved to be called genocide,
but the term did not apply because the victim could not be included in any of the groups protected by the
Genocide Convention. In the “Aguirre” case, the Tribunal found that the crimes were committed “in the
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context of the international crime of genocide”. In the “Avellaneda” and “Campo de Mayo” cases, prosecutors
Javier De Luca, Marcelo Garcia Berro and Patricio Murray argued that there had been a political genocide in
Argentina. Alejandro Alagia, the prosecutor in the “Atlético-Banco-Olimpo” case, brought specific charges of
genocide asking for a conviction for a genocide charge, even if the Tribunal finally convicted in that case for
crimes against humanity.
In other words, the Argentine courts have so far not convicted anybody of genocide in Argentina
until verdicts in 2012 and 2013 in the cases Madrid and Manacorda,16 but in some previous cases they have
recognized that genocide took place. Why? The arguments for not applying the term genocide until 2012 can
be summarized as follows:
• Procedural arguments: a conviction for genocide would affect the principle of congruence because
the defendants were not investigated for this crime until the cases Madrid and Manacorda, which
started in 2011.
• Background legal arguments: (i) the Convention lacks regulation and applicable penalties; (ii) the
cases do not fit into the categories of the Convention (mainly the question of the four protected
groups).
a) Procedural arguments
Experts on criminal procedural law argue that the term genocide involves a violation of the principle of
congruence because the defendants have not been investigated for this crime. However, there is a tendency to
overlook the fact that the concept of genocide denotes not one crime but a whole category of offenses, and is a
qualification added to certain crimes only when the element of genocidal intent has been proven.
Indeed, the defendants were not investigated for genocide or crimes against humanity, and could not
have been, because those words do not designate specific crimes but sets of crimes, namely those resulting
from the catalogs of Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
and Article 6 and 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. These crimes have their counterparts
in the respective offenses of the Argentine Criminal Code, and it is the latter for which all defendants must be
and, in fact, have been investigated.
As mentioned above, the concept of genocide is a qualification added to certain crimes. As such, it
entails all the same material, personal, geographical and temporal consequences of crimes against humanity.
However, it raises no procedural obstacles any more than does the category of crimes against humanity, which
has been used many times by Argentine courts including the Supreme Court.
b) Background legal arguments
1. Lack of regulation and applicable sanction: it is objected that the crime of genocide is not punishable under
the Argentine Criminal Code, so there is no assignment of penalties for the offense.
On the other hand, it should be noted that, as mentioned before, genocide as a crime under international
law is a category of crimes that are defined individually and have their own specific penalties in the Argentine
Criminal Code. The crime of genocide is not specifically provided for, but all individual crimes that can
constitute genocide are included. Crimes against humanity are not provided for as a separate category in
the Argentine Criminal Code, either. However, this does not prevent their qualification as crimes against
humanity and there are a number of specific criminal offenses that can be classified in this way.
In addition, the issue of lack of sanction of genocide is not new but long-standing, and was finally settled
some time ago at the level of international law. In fact, specific penalties and punishments for the practices
complained of were absent in all the instruments of international criminal law until the adoption of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court in July 1998 (Article 77). Until then, all instruments, including the
Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, lacked applicable penalties and punishments. Consequently,
the penalties applied under the international rule of law were the same as those prescribed by national criminal
law for similar offenses.
In this regard, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) states
that the penalties imposed by the Court shall be limited to imprisonment, and for the length of the sentence
the Court shall be guided by general practice relating to sentences of imprisonment imposed by the courts
of the former Yugoslavia (Article 24(1) of the Statute). And the same rule is laid down in Article 23(1) of the
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

©2013

Genocide Studies and Prevention 8, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.1.3

10

Ferreira

An historical example is the trial of the former Gestapo chief in Lyon, Klaus Barbie, in France on July 4,
1987, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment for seventeen crimes against humanity. In this case,
the Nuremberg Charter was used to define the offense (because in France there was no offense called crimes
against humanity), and the French Criminal Code was used for sentencing (to a period of imprisonment
because France had already abolished the death penalty).
The Genocide Convention does not contain a description of the penalties to be applied in relation to each
crime provided for, but transfers this responsibility to the competent authorities of the State party. Article 5 of
the Genocide Convention provides that “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention
and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide”. The Convention gives each
State the power to decide what those measures and penalties shall be.
Argentina acceded to the Genocide Convention by Decree 6286/56 of April 9, 1956, and the criminal
penalties and punishments for conduct proscribed by it were already established in the Criminal Code
before ratification just as the penalties and punishments applied to Klaus Barbie had already been established
beforehand in France. Similarly, all of those convicted under the Nuremberg and Tokyo Statutes, or by the ad
hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were sentenced according to national laws.
Indeed, as noted by Mirta Mántaras, the obligation under Article V of the Convention has been fulfilled with
the rule which incorporated it into the Argentine legal system- Legislative Decree 6286/56 of April 9, 1956 - and no
other specific law would be necessary, as the Convention details each of the actions that constitutes genocide: (a)
killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm; (c) deliberately inflicting conditions of
life calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Mántaras argues that “if
the offenses are accurately described, as they are here, the Convention is operational, which means that it applies
directly to the judgment”.17 Furthermore, criminal penalties and punishments are already incorporated into the
Criminal Code, and are as follows: the killing of a group would be aggravated murder with life imprisonment
(Articles 70-82 of the Criminal Code); serious physical or mental injuries are provided for in Articles 83-93 of
the Criminal Code; unlawful detention is provided for in Articles 140-144 of the Criminal Code; and the forcible
transfer of children from one group to another amounts to withholding or concealing minors and suppression
of identity, included in Articles 149 and 138 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, the Argentine Criminal Code
allows multiple cases over the same subject matter - as in the case of genocide - to be assigned to the same judge.
This makes large-scale convictions and punishments a real if little considered possibility.18
Moreover, the Argentine legal system expressly mentions genocide as an aggravating factor in Article
2 of Law 23.592, known as the anti-discrimination law: “The most lenient penalty on the scale of criminal
penalties for offences punishable by the Criminal Code and supplementary laws shall be increased by one
third and the harshest penalty by one half when the offence is committed by means of persecution or out of
hatred of a race or religion or for the purpose of destroying all or part of a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group. In no case may the punishment imposed exceed the applicable statutory maximum.”
Finally, in the present state of international law, a customary rule on genocide has gradually developed
under which the Convention binds all States. There are no longer any escape routes: even States that have
not ratified the Convention are bound by its terms.19 Thus, the International Court of Justice in its Advisory
Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention said that “the principles of the Convention are principles
recognized as binding on the States by civilized nations, even in the absence of a treaty obligation”.20
In short, any argument that asserts the inapplicability of the figure of genocide due to lack of regulation
is unacceptable since no State can invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty.21 To do so would put the Argentina in breach of its international obligations.22
2. Lack of fit with the categories of the Convention: The Genocide Convention provides four victim groups
-national, ethnic, racial and religious, excluding political groups. So, it is argued that the Convention would be
irrelevant to Argentina because the victims do not fit into any of these four categories. In Argentina a political
struggle was waged between the military and armed left-wing groups, so that in any case it would be a political
genocide, and as such excluded from the Convention definition.
This was the position of the amicus curiae brief filed by the human rights organization Nizkor in the case
brought against Adolfo Scilingo in Spain, based on the analysis of Yale University’s law clinic. Nizkor says:
“The victims of the Argentine military were considered as targets for their alleged political beliefs ... they were
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not under attack ‘by reason of their membership in a group’ as required by the genocidal intent standard, but
rather on the basis of their supposed individual political views.”
A weaker version admits the existence of genocide but not the legal applicability of the Convention. In
this regard, the Federal Court of Tucuman in the “Vargas Aignasse” case said: “This Court recognizes that the
degree of blameworthiness in the crimes committed against Claudio Guillermo Vargas Aignasse is the same
as that that required for the international crime of genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention and in
this sense the crimes constitute genocidal practices and also their intellectual authors are clearly genocidaires
under any non-legal definition of genocide, but, for the reasons mentioned ut supra, it is understood that the
victim cannot be included in any of the protected groups of the Genocide Convention.”
This article proposes that these interpretations are too narrow and do not match the real situation. It is
right in principle to say that there was a political genocide, but the statement falls short: it was political, yet
much more than political. The crimes committed during the self-styled “National Reorganization Process”
constitute genocide under the terms of the 1948 Convention, and victims must fall into the category of partial
national group, not merely political group, which is a much less comprehensive category.
The correct approach is that the 1976 dictatorship was not merely a response to the actions of the armed
left, but a project to transform Argentine society as a whole. Terror was directed at each and every member of
society in a systematic intent to transform the social relations of an entire people and bring about permanent
changes in politics and the economy. Terror was thus directed at the entire population, and many of those
killed were social, neighborhood and student activists - and even children without any political affiliation. In
the words of Ibérico Saint Jean, a former de facto governor of Buenos Aires Province: “First we will kill all the
subversives, then we will kill their collaborators, then their sympathizers, then those who remain indifferent,
and finally we will kill the timid.”23 On the other hand, if the process is seen as a confrontation between
two groups, we fail to understand the perpetrators’ intentional and systematic attempt at social and national
reorganization. Not surprisingly the perpetrators defined extermination as a ‘National Reorganization Process’
and not one of political reorganization.
The military’s own documents and regulations of the period defined the Argentine population as the
objective. Annex 2 of the Army’s Plan Contributing to the National Security Plan, in a section titled “Enemy
status summary... A) Identifying the adversary defines the adversary or enemy as: “... all organizations or
elements thereof in our country or that may arise in the process, which in any way oppose the takeover
of power and / or hinder the normal development of the Military Government”24 Point B) then goes on to
classify adversaries into ‘Active’ and ‘Potential’. The first turned out to be those who, at that time, opposed
the takeover of power by parts of the armed forces and / or that might hinder the future development of the
military government, while the latter were those who might do so in future. In other words, an adversary was
anyone that might oppose them -in any way - in the present or future.
The military secret file RC-9-1, “Operations against subversive elements” is one of the best files to prove
the dolus specialis required by the Genocide crime. Section 1017 stipulates: “In the operating environment, the
status of the population is the most critical counter-subversion factor. It is here that the forces of law and order
should focus their main attention.”Section 2001 further adds that: “Any event, however insignificant, produces
a dividend for political subversion ... it influences a subversive element which is of vital importance, namely,
the population, by exploiting for conquest and domination what is commonly referred to as frustrations or
dissatisfactions, whether national or sector-based.”
“For these [frustrations or dissatisfactions] to exist, it is essential that they are recognized as such by the
social group or sector that experiences them, that is, the following circumstances must exist:
• the group must consciously recognize a good as desirable;
• the same group or social sector must be aware, at the same time, that the desired good cannot be
achieved under the current political, social or economic conditions.”25
The same document in Annex 3 includes as active or potential adversaries “political-military, political
and similar organizations, labor unions, student and religious organizations and persons connected with
them”. It further states that “the concept is prevention, not cure ... (Activists) should be captured immediately
wherever they are, whether at home, on the street or at work (factory, office, educational institution, etc.)”.
In other words, workers, office workers, educators and students were all targets. Section 3021 also includes
children: “The evacuation of detainees will occur as quickly as possible after separation by groups: leaders,
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men, women, children, immediately after capture.” In the same line, Military Secret File C9-I/ 1977 establishes
labor unionists and other social groups as the primary targets for ‘preventive action’.
The “Psychological Operations Regulation”-Argentine Army RC-5-1-RESERVED is another fundamental
file to prove the dolus specialis and it shows that State violence was not a reaction to the armed groups of the
left, but was scheduled earlier.26 The document, signed by Alejandro Agustín Lanusse on November 8, 1968,
states:
“1007. Classification of Psychological Operations: 1) National Strategic Psychological Operations: These
will be directed at large segments of the country’s population chosen as targets… “Section 2004, Compulsive
action method: the compulsive action method will be any action that tends to motivate behaviors and attitudes
by appealing to instincts. It will act on the instinct for self-preservation and other basic human tendencies
(the unconscious). Psychological pressure will engender anxiety; massive, generalized anxiety may lead to
terror and that is enough to keep the public (the target) at the mercy of any subsequent influence. [The use
of] force will involve coercion and even mental violence. Usually this method will be driven, accompanied
and supported by physical or material efforts tending towards the same result. Here, strength and vigor will
replace the instruments of reason. The technique of physical deeds and hidden psychological methods will be
channeled into producing compulsive action…
“10,008. Planning of psychological operations: 2) In preparing plans for psychological operations... it
should be understood that among the above targets there are three main objectives: the [security] forces
themselves, the civilian population and irregular enemy forces.”27
The assertion that the entire population was a target for terror is also found in the words of the perpetrators
themselves. “Little has been done to fulfill the other objectives that aim to defeat not only the guerrillas
but subversion in toto”.28 Another stated: “The aggressor in this type of struggle is not just the bomber, the
gunman or the kidnapper. At the intellectual level, it is anyone that tries to change our way of life by promoting
subversive ideas; in other words, who tries to subvert, change or disrupt [our] values [...] A terrorist is not
just someone who kills with a gun or a bomb, but anyone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and
Christian civilization”.29 (Still another noted that: “It would be absurd to suppose that we have won the war
against subversion simply because we have removed the armed threat [...] Residual elements of subversion are
now appearing in religious, political, educational, economic, cultural and employment spheres”.30
In recent declarations, Videla has stated quite bluntly that “Our goal was to discipline a society in the
grips of anarchy, return it to its principles, its natural channels [...] A new model, a fairly radical change;
society had to be disciplined for it to be more efficient.”31
IV. Composition of the Generic Group
It is contented here that, in the case of genocide, the victim group is not verified objectively, from a
constant feature of reality, but is constructed subjectively through an intellectual operation. The group does not
pre-exist ‘as such’ but is always constructed by the repressors who, according to one set of criteria or another,
trace a circle around certain people, like a predatory animal stalking its prey. The genocidaires construct the
group. Any group of people can fall victim to genocide.
The construction of the group as such is purely subjective: it is a slice of reality. Reality is cut into portions,
one way or another, on the basis of an arbitrary decision. The group does not exist in nature, but only as an
intellectual construction: a classification. This classification is cultural and subjective; there are no true or false
classifications just as there are no true or false names.32
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda said in relation to the classification of Hutus and Tutsis
as “ethnic groups” that “for purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, the membership of a group is,
in essence, a subjective rather than an objective concept. The genocide perpetrator perceives the victim as
belonging to a group destined for destruction. In some cases, the victims may also perceive themselves as
belonging to that group.”33
In relation to Argentina, Mirta Mántaras has argued that in “Argentina the destruction of a national
group took place. This group was not pre-existing, but was created by the perpetrators at the same time
as individuals appeared expressing their opposition to the economic plan that had been implemented [...]
The national group was gradually made up of workers, students, politicians, teenagers, children, employees,
housewives, journalists and anyone who the perpetrators suspected for any reason of hindering the
achievement of their goals (...) Most of these people did not know one another, but fell under the common
denominator of ‘opponent’ (...) They did not need to carry out specific acts of opposition: the mere possibility
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that they might act in someone’s defense was enough for the perpetrators to include them in the national
group to be destroyed.”34
Similarly, Martin Losada has said that “the restrictive enumeration of protected groups should not make
us lose sight of the fact that the choice of a group targeted for destruction is an essential element of genocide ...
the victim-group is not always a social reality; it is often the result of a representation created by the murderers,
who see it and construct it ideologically as a threat to their own survival.”35
V. Composition of the National Group
The definition of the Argentine genocide as the elimination of the national group was first established by
Judge Baltasar Garzón, who made it clear in his indictment of Scilingo and other Argentine military officials
that “the characterization as a ‘national group’ is absolutely valid for examining the events that took place in
Argentina since the perpetrators intended to destroy a particular web of social relations in a State in order to
bring about a change substantial enough to alter the life of the whole”.36
However, Judge Garzón’s interpretation was rejected on several doctrinal fronts, and his indictment was
reversed in the Spanish National Court. The main challenge to the use of the term ‘genocide’ came from the
amicus curiae brief filed by the human rights organization Nizkor. Based on an analysis by Yale University’s
law clinic, it argued that “National origin, as used in international instruments and literature, refers to persons
having a certain culture, language and traditional way of life peculiar to a nation. ... Consequently, victims of
the Argentine military were not a national group…” In the same way, the amicus curiae presented at the ABO
trial by the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, together with the legal expert opinion
of Theo van Boven, excluded the term genocide on the grounds that the victims of massive human rights
violations during the dictatorship were not a national group: “the victims of the Argentine military came from
different cultures, different lifestyles and even different nations...”
Also, the judgments that sentenced Bussi (Head of the Third Army, in charge of the repression in the
provinces of Córdoba and Tucumán) in the Vargas Aignasse case, and the murderers of Floreal Avellaneda,
state that “The explicit meaning (of the expression ‘national group’)... is associated with the concern of the
international community to provide protection to national minorities in the context of the emergence of
multinational states at the end of the Second World War. Well, it is difficult to argue that Argentina was a
multinational State at the time the events took place.”
All these interpretations are, to some extent, contradictory. In Nizkor’s analysis, victims do not constitute
a national group because they are not united by a “certain culture, language and traditional way of life”. This
implies that each national group is a homogeneous group with a single language and culture, which is exactly
the same interpretation that perpetrators, i.e. Nazis or Ittihadist perpetrators, use to think about their own
societies. Van Boven says the same when he excludes from the national group cultures, ways of life and
different nations, which, as such, would not be part of the national group because they are not alike. On the
other hand, the Argentine courts have reached the opposite conclusion and suggest that the victims are not a
national group because they are too much alike, and not multinational.
In either case, the victims cannot be a national group - because they are either too much alike, or too
different. The hat is either too big or too small, and our head is to blame, not the size of the hat.
In addition, it seems that we are not even allowed to wear the hat, as it is a European garment far too
elegant for us. To characterize the national group as a characteristic of multinational States is natural on
a continent like Europe where many languages are
 spoken in the same country, and where, as a result of
continuous wars, borders have, until recently, changed overnight, leaving national minorities trapped in
hostile countries. With this criterion the Convention would apply only in Europe: a privilege of European
nations. Legal rules should be interpreted according to the context in which they are applied, and must adapt
to reality, not the reverse.
The common mistake or misconception is to define nationality in terms of supposedly objective criteria
that do not stand up to scrutiny, and as such are unverifiable: language, culture and ways of life.
There are countries that have a unified language, culture and way of life, and constitute a nation. Some
countries have multiple languages, cultures and ways of life and constitute a nation. Sometimes there is
unity of language, culture and way of life in different countries (for example, Argentina and Uruguay). The
prosecutor Alejandro Alagia argued in his submission in the ABO case that “When the French Declaration
of Human Rights was passed in 1795, very few people spoke French. The most extreme case was the Italian
nation, where only 2.5% of the population used the official language in everyday life. In conclusion, there is
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no reason to consider language or any other cultural criteria as an objective standard to identify the national
group of the 1948 Convention.”
Any supposedly objective investigation of nationality also implies discrimination because it does not
even leave the victims with the status of nationals. This is no small mistake: Jews or Gypsies could not be
Germans within the German nation. The attempt to define nationality in terms of objective criteria is then
a tragic mistake, because it runs along the same line of reasoning that once allowed the Nazis to decide who
formed part of the nation and who should be excluded.37
Finally, an objective nationality based on blood, race or language, ignores the Argentine National
Constitution, which establishes residence for two consecutive years as the only requirement for foreigners
wishing to obtain Argentine citizenship. Citizenship does not depend on any cultural criteria38 although “the
authorities may shorten this term in favor of any applicant claiming and proving services to the Republic”
(Article 20). Moreover, this formal and subjective criterion is unanimously accepted in international law,
where the right not only to acquire but also to change one’s nationality undermines any claim to objective
criteria.39
The national group is created by the bond between people as individuals and the nation: a purely formal
and subjective criterion. The ICTR described it as follows: “it is comprised of individuals that share a legal
bond based on common citizenship granting them reciprocal rights and obligations.”40 Such is also the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Advisory Opinion OC4/84,41 based on the
doctrine established in 1955 by the International Court of Justice in The Hague in the Nottebohm case.42
The Court ruled that “Nationality is the political and legal bond that links a person to a given State and
binds him to it with ties of loyalty and fidelity, entitling him to diplomatic protection from that State”.43 This
doctrine is mandatory for Argentina because Argentina’s Supreme Court, in the “Giroldi” case, made the
pronouncements of the Inter-American Court mandatory, including its judgments and advisory opinions.44
The concept of nationality thus defined does not indicate a person’s ethnicity or sociological nationality
but that person’s political or legal nationality,45 which can only be conferred by the State. Indeed, the basic rule
on this issue is that questions of nationality fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the State: only national law,
not international law, can determine who are or are not nationals of a given country.46
VI. Composition of the partial national group
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide refers to crimes committed
with the intent to destroy all or part of a group, which includes the partial national group. A partial national
group is a part of the whole nation. But does this mean it is a subset or a cross-section of the population? In
other words, when we speak of a national group, do we mean some or all members of the population? Is a
national group essentially the same as an ethnic, racial or religious group or is it a broader-based notion?
Both the concept of genocide and the word itself were coined by Raphael Lemkin, who stated that “by
genocide we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group”. Lemkin argues that “Genocide is directed
against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their
individual capacity, but as members of the national group”. In short, genocide is the destruction of a national
or ethnic group. Yet in a footnote Lemkin clarifies the concept of ethnicity: “another term could be used for
the same idea namely, ‘ethnocide’ consisting of the Greek word ‘ethnos’ and Latin ‘cide’.”47 For Lemkin, the
concept of ethnicity overlaps to a certain extent with that of national group. Lemkin continues by saying that
“Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group, the other, the
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor”. The concept of national pattern clearly prevails. Lemkin
does not say ethnic, racial or religious but national pattern.48
He also clearly states that the national group is the generic term. He says: Many authors, instead of
using a generic term used current terms connoting only some functional aspect of the main generic notion
of genocide. Thus, the terms ‘Germanization’, ‘Magyarization’, ‘Italianisation’, for example, are used to connote
the imposition by a stronger nation (Germany, Hungary, Italy), of its national pattern upon a national group
controlled by it.”49
It is clear that, in contrast to the generic term, the specific terms also refer to national groups. That is “the
main generic notion of genocide”. So strong is this idea that Lemkin says that “nations are essential elements
of the world community. The world represents only so much culture and intellectual vigor as are created
by its component national groups... the destruction of a nation, therefore, represents the loss of its future
contributions to the world.”50
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The notion of nation also predominates when Lemkin describes ‘Techniques of genocide in different
fields’ in Chapter IX of his book. The fields in question are: political, social, cultural, economic, biological,
physical, religious and moral. In the political field, he says, “The techniques of genocide, which the German
occupant has developed in the various occupied countries, represent a concentrated and coordinated attack
upon all elements of nationhood: ...In order further to disrupt national unity, Nazi party organizations were
established... In line with this policy of imposing the German national pattern.”51
Regarding the social field, Lemkin says that “The destruction of the national pattern in the social field
has been accomplished in part by the abolition of local law and local courts and the imposition of German
law and courts, and also by Germanization of the judicial language and of the bar. The social structure of a
nation being vital to its national development, the occupant also endeavors to bring about such changes as
may weaken the national spiritual resources.”52 Regarding the cultural field, Lemkin argues that “In order to
prevent the expression of the national spirit through artistic media, a rigid control of all cultural activities has
been introduced. All persons engaged in painting, drawing, sculpture, music, literature, and the theater are
required to obtain a license for the continuation of their activities.”53
Concerning the economic field, he says that “Participation in economic life is thus made dependent
upon one’s being German or being devoted to the cause of Germanism. Consequently, promoting a national
ideology other than German is made difficult and dangerous.”54 About the biological field, Lemkin says “In
the occupied countries of “people of non-related blood,” a policy of depopulation is pursued... [through] the
adoption of measures calculated to decrease the birthrate.”55 Concerning the physical realm, he says “The
physical debilitation and even annihilation of national groups in occupied countries is carried out mainly in
the following ways: I. Racial Discrimination in Feeding… 2. Endangering of Health… and 3. Mass Murder”.56
In the religious field, he states that “[i]n Luxemburg, where the population is predominantly Catholic and
religion plays an important role in national life, especially in the field of education, the occupant has tried
to disrupt these national and religious influences.”57 About the moral field, Lemkin believes that “[i]n order
to weaken the spiritual resistance of the national group, the occupant attempts to create an atmosphere of
moral debasement within this group… According to this plan, the mental energy of the group should be
concentrated upon base instincts and should be diverted from moral and national thinking.”58
It is clear then that for Lemkin the national group was broader in scope than an ethnic, racial or religious
group. The national group in principle includes all members of the nation and the remaining groups, by
definition, are subsumed into this larger group. The inclusion of ethnic, racial and religious groups is meant
to highlight typical cases of genocide, but these groups do not exhaust the meaning of the word genocide.
Moreover, the national group subsumes and surpasses the others: it refers to ethnic, racial and religious groups
and something more. Indeed, it covers any group not included in the ethnic, racial or religious categories. Thus
it contains all minority groups that may be subject to persecution, whoever they may be. This includes groups
that share a different membership criteria from ethnicity, race or religion, such as: the elderly, transvestites,
the disabled, the ugly, or whoever. The national group thus has an inner limit, covering ethnic, racial and
religious groups, and an outer limit, which goes beyond the previous one and includes other possible groups.
Any other interpretation inevitably leads to discriminatory consequences, both in terms of what the
national group covers (its inner boundary) as what the national group exceeds (its outer boundary). Thus:
−− Inner boundary: if we hold that the national group does not cover ethnic, racial or religious
groups, we commit the same discrimination as the Nazi genocidaires, who excluded Jews and
other groups from the German nation. In their view, Jews, homosexuals, the disabled, etc., were
not Germans but something different, only fit to be exterminated. The same applies to all cases of
genocide, including Argentina’s.
−− Outer boundary: if the national group does not include sexual minorities, the elderly, the
disabled, etc., then the principle of equality before the law is violated. To interpret the Convention
as meaning that some lives are more important than others is to create an unacceptable hierarchy
of human existence.
Such is the extent of the partial national group, and any other interpretation that excludes groups
or individuals smacks of violation of the principle of equality before the law enshrined in Article 16 of
the Argentine Constitution. This should be understood at a universal level and at all national legal levels
because Advisory Opinion 18/2003 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on “Status and Rights
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of Undocumented Migrants” established that the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination
belongs to the domain of jus cogens, and consequently “entails obligations erga omnes on third parties”. Also,
that Advisory Opinion reminds us that under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Human Rights Committee noted the broad scope of Article 26 of the Covenant, which establishes the basic
principle of equality and non-discrimination, and its General Comment No. 18 held on this principle that
Art. 26 of the Covenant provides in itself an “autonomous right”, and the application of that principle in
the content is not limited to the rights set forth in the Covenant. This enlightened approach of the Human
Rights Committee contributed to the ruling by the European Court of Human Rights on a violation of Art.14
of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Case Gaygusuz versus Austria (1996), as well as the
requirements established in legal doctrine that “distinctions” must be reasonable and consistent with the law
(to avoid discrimination) have led to the suggestion that a true “right to equality” has emerged.
VII. Conclusion: The construction of memory and the value of truth
Even though most jurists consider sentencing to be important, legal characterizations are much more
so. Much more important than the punishment of criminals is the construction of collective memory. It is
important to uncover the truth about massive human rights abuses because concealing the truth causes great
harm.59 I suggest that the terms genocide and crimes against humanity have different connotations. Genocide
implies a collective responsibility. As genocide aims at the elimination of the group, it involves us all: we
cannot say others were guilty or unfortunate. Crimes against humanity are construed differently: multiple
individual isolated crimes can be watered down and alienated as someone else’s problem.
The choice between treating human rights abuses in Argentina as the genocide of a national group or
merely as thousands of unconnected crimes against humanity (even if part of a widespread or systematic
attack) involves two different ways of constructing the past, each linked to a different social model. A caring
society, which is precisely what the dictatorship set out to repress, or a law-of-the-jungle society, which is
precisely what they tried to establish and which flourished in the 1990s - a society that promoted shameless
self-interest, an “I’m alright, Jack” attitude, unbridled frivolity, and the forced imposition of an economic model
that Argentine society had rejected for decades. Thousands of convictions for unconnected offenses not only
hides the truth but also perpetuates the greater crime of the destruction and transformation (‘reorganization’,
in the words of the perpetrators) of the whole national group. It is necessary, then, to salvage the truth and
recognize that genocide – rather than crimes against humanity - took place in Argentina; and that it was
genocide against a national rather than a political group.
Legally speaking, the figure of Genocide is directly applicable in Argentina’s domestic legal order as a
customary international law norm ratified by the State in 1956 through the ratification of the United Nations
Genocide Convention. In this interpretation, the national group is not defined by supposedly objective
criteria, such as the unity or plurality of language, culture and ways of life (sociological nationality), but by
the purely formal and subjective criteria of the legal bond between people and the nation (legal nationality),
a criterion imposed by Argentina’s various domestic legal systems, as well as by international law in general.
In Lemkin’s work, the national group is the generic group, which both includes and goes beyond ethnic,
racial and religious groups, and also allows the incorporation of any other group that could be a victim of the
crimes defined in the Convention. This conclusion is also universal, based on the basic principle of equality
and non-discrimination.
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